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Title VII-Time Limitation for Filing Charge with
EEOC Is Subject to Equitable Tolling
Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp. *
I. Introduction
A federal district court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a
private action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 only after the
plaintiff has filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC)2 and allowed the Commission at least 180 days to obtain the
employer's compliance with the Act. 3 The Act sets time limits within which the
complainant must file this charge. 4 In Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical Corp.,5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether the
timely filing of an EEOC charge is ajurisdictional prerequisite to the pursuit of
a judicial remedy under Title VII.
The plaintiff in Hart did not file her charge of employment discrimination
until well after the expiration of the appropriate Title VII time limit6 which had
begun to run the day the plaintiff was fired. Claiming, however, that she did
not discover the allegedly sexually discriminatory reason for her firing until the
filing period had expired, the plaintiff argued that the court should toll the time
period for filing in her case until the date on which she discovered that her
employer allegedly misled her as to the reason for her termination.
In two earlier decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States described
the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC as a "jurisdictional prerequisite"
to a later Title VII suit.7 Such a description, strictly .construed, could lead to
harsh results, since a court can neither waive nor modify a jurisdictional
prerequisite. Even if a delay in filing was due to the defendant's misrepresenta-
tions, a court could not apply estoppel to prevent the defendant from raising
the issue of lack of jurisdiction.
. 598 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1979).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Jurisdiction is conferred upon the federal district courts at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(3) (1976). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 hereinafter referred to as the "Act."
2 Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
hereinafter referred to as the "EEOC" or the "Commission."
3 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(f) requires the EEOC to notify the charging party if it has neither obtained a
conciliation nor brought suit against the alleged violator within 180 days from the filing of the charge. The
individual may then seek a "right to sue" letter from the Commission. The charging party may request this
letter at an earlier date if the EEOC dismisses the charge during the 180 day period. The EEOC has inter-
preted the statute in its regulations merely to require issuance of this notice upon demand at an earlier stage
in the administrative proceedings if it determines .that those proceedings will probably not be completed
within 180 days of the filing. 29 C.F.R. S 1601.28(a) (1978).
4 The time limits are listed at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), which provides in pertinent part:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the al-
leged unlawful employment practice occurred. . . , except that in a case of an unlawful employ-
ment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with
a state or local agency . . . .such charge shall be filed . . . within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.
5 598 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1979).
6 See note 4 supra.
7 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 47 (1973).
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The Third Circuit,8 through careful analysis of the relation of the filing
limitation to the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Title VII, found that
the Supreme Court's use of the term "jurisdictional prerequisite" did not
preclude a court from interpreting the limitation more liberally. The court then
proceeded to conclude that because the time limits for filing the charge were
analogous to a statute of limitations, they were, therefore, subject to the prin-
ciples of equitable tolling. Although the Court of Appeals declined to toll the fil-
ing period in Hart because the plantiff's testimony indicated that she may have
suspected discrimination when she was fired, Hart could facilitate enforcement
of Title VII against employers whose discrimination is more difficult to detect
or less likely to be reported.
II. Facts of the Case
In January, 1973, the defendant employer hired Dr. Hart as Director of
Clinical Evaluation to prepare submissions for the company to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). 9 Her supervisor fired her on July 29, 1973, offer-
ing her four reasons for her termination: (1) inability to understand FDA
regulations; (2) inability to prepare an FDA submission; (3) inability to work
against time deadlines; and (4) inability to get along with company executives.
Dr. Hart alleged that she discovered a sex-related reason for her discharge
in December, 1973, when she learned that the supervisor complained that she
had been "bowled over 'by aggressive men" 10 at work. At her deposition,
however, she testified that her suspicions began when her supervisor fired her,
but retained a male biochemist he frequently complained about.
Under Title VII Dr. Hart had up to 180 days after her firing to file a
charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC.t  Alternatively, she
could have filed her charge with the Civil Rights Division of the NewJersey At-
torney General's Office, in which case Title VII would have allowed her up to
300 days to file it with the EEOC.12 Hart failed to contact either agency until
September 22, 1974 (421 days after her firing), when she wrote a letter to the
EEOC.1 3 She did not file a formal charge with the EEOC until November 17,
1974, a full 477 days after her termination. The Commission referred her com-
8 The opinion was written by judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. For a review of several notable opin-
ions involving racial discrimination authored by Judge Higginbotham see Kommers and Schwartz, Civil
Rights and Legal Order: The Work of A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 181 (1978).
9 Appellant's Appendix at 6.
10 This supervisor later told a representative of the EEOC that Dr. Hart was intimidated at meetings by
male chemists and technicians who would toss back reports and submissions or tear them up. Appellant's
Appendix at 53.
11 See note 4 supra. The discussion in this comment is limited to specific discriminatory acts and does not
include those ongoing unlawful employment practices which are considered to be "continuing violations" of
Title VII. Allegations of "continuing" discrimination need not be filed with the EEOC within any definite
time period after any particular instance of discrimination, but may be filed at any time during which the
practice complained of continues. For a fuller explanation of the continuing violation doctrine and its han-
dling by the courts see Note, Continuing Violations of Title VII: A Suggested Approach, 63 MINN. L. REy. 119
(1978).
12 See note 4 supra.
13 This letter could have constituted a charge under the EEOC regulations in effect at the time. 29
C.F.R. 5 1601.1 l(b) (1974) provides that, "a charge is deemed filed when the Commission receives from
the person making a charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties and to describe
generally the action or practices complained of."
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plaint to New Jersey's Civil Rights Division,1 4 which quickly waived any
jurisdiction it had over the charge. 15 After the Commission's investigation,' 6 it
issued Dr. Hart a "right to sue letter,' 1 7 and she instituted a private Title VII
action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.18
The plaintiff could come within the statutory filing limit only by arguing
that: (1) the 300-day limitation should be applied, since her charge was referred
to a state agency by the EEOC; and (2) the limitation period was considered
triggered by her December, 1973, discovery of the alleged sexually biased
reason for her termination, and not by her actual discharge.' 9 The district
court held that it had the equitable power to toll the filing requirement, but
declined to do so due to the plaintiffs testimony supporting the contention that
she suspected her termination to be sex-related at the time of her firing. 20 The
court concluded that the plaintiff's delay left unsatisfied the "jurisdictional
prerequisite" of a charge timely filed with the EEOC, so that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint.
On review, the Court of Appeals held that the district court's decision not
to toll the filing limitation from the date of plaintiffs discharge until December,
1973, was not reversible error. 2' Since the district court had asserted that it
possessed the power to apply equitable modification to this "jurisdictional
prerequisite," the Court of Appeals took the opportunity to analyze the nature
of the time limit.
III. The Nature of the Filing Limitation
A. The Origin of the 'Jurisdictional Prerequisite" Concept
Congress placed a heavy reliance on the informal methods of "conference,
conciliation, and persuasion" 22 to promote compliance with Title VII's objec-
tive of elimination of discrimination in employment based on an individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 23 It conferred jurisdiction of Title
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) requires a complainant to give a state or local agency the first oppor-
tunity to resolve the charge of discrimination. The United States Supreme Court has held that the EEOC's
practice of notifying the appropriate state agency of a complaint initially filed with the Commission, and of
then deferring to that state agency, satisfies the requirements of this statute. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S.
522 (1972). See text accompanying note 32 infra.
15 New Jersey state law also required that a charge of employment discrimination be filed with the state
agency within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-18 (West 1976).
16 The EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that theJ. T. Baker Chemical Co.
discriminated against Dr. Hart in its decision to terminate her employment and in its later handling of
employment references. Appellant's Appendix at 57.
17 The terms "right to sue letter" or "notice of right to sue" are not found in the language of Title VII,
but are shorthand terms used by the courts and the EEOC to refer to the notice given pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
S 2000e-5(l) (1976) which triggers the charging party's right to seek a judicial remedy.
18 Besides the Title VII count, Hart's complaint alleged interference with her prospective economic ad-
vantage and contractual relations with prospective employers.
19 While no exact date in December was given on which Dr. Hart allegedly discovered that her ter-
mination may have been sex-related, only the 300-day period could possibly reach the date on which she
first contacted the EEOC, September 22, 1974. The applicability of this longer filing limit was not decided
on appeal, since the filing limitation was not tolled, but was held to have commenced on July 29, 1973.
20 In addition, Dr. Hart's September 22, 1974, letter to the EEOC contained no reference to the
"bowled over" remark. Dr. Hart only mentioned adverse references, the four reasons her supervisor gave
her for her termination, and her suspicion regarding the male biochemist who was not fired.
21 598 F.2d at 834.
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
[April 19801
VII suits on the federal courts but intended that a plaintiff first give the ad-
ministrative process an opportunity to resolve disputes through these informal
methods before the plaintiff could seek a judicial remedy.2 4 To prevent the
bypassing of the administrative mechanisms, it made the plaintiffs filing of a
complaint with the EEOC a prerequisite to a court's exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction.25
It was not clear whether Congress intended jurisdiction to be contingent
upon the plaintiffs precise compliance with the EEOC's various statutory pro-
cedural steps, including those related to timeliness of the filing. 26 In an early
Title VII case, Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 27 the Seventh Circuit noted that
some of these procedural steps were "directory and technical rather than man-
datory and substantive" and related "solely to the administrative rather than
the judicial features of the statute.' '28 It identified three "jurisdictional prereq-
uisites" to commencement of a private Title VII action: (1) timely initiation of
the administrative process; (2) receipt of the "right to sue notice" by the plain-
tiff; and (3) filing of the complaint with the district court within the statutory
time limits. 2 9 This was the first suggestion by a Court of Appeals that the
timeliness of the filing of a charge with the EEOC affected a court's subject
matter jurisdiction.
B. Equitable Tolling
Four years after the Seventh Circuit's holding in Choate, the Supreme
Court of the United States offered some guidance to courts in the interpretation
of Title VII provisions. In Love v. Pullman Co. 30 the Supreme Court declined to
read requirements into Title VII which "would serve no purpose other than
the creation of an additional procedural technicality. '3t The plaintiff in Love
filed a complaint with the EEOC first, although Title VII required an initial fil-
ing with a state civil rights commission.3 2 The EEOC's practice in such in-
stances was to notify the state commission of the charge and to hold the charge
in abeyance while the state disposed of the case or waived jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court noted that this procedure was not prejudicial to the defendant,
but that to seek literal compliance with Title VII by requiring the complainant
24 This is the interpretation which courts have offered for 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(1) (1976), which states
that an aggrieved claimant may bring a civil action against the charged party if the Commission fails to
achieve a voluntary conciliation of the dispute. See, e.g., Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Const. Corp., 437 F.2d
1136, 1139 (5th Cir. 1971).
25 Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972).
26 Defendants to Title VII suits have argued at various times that imprecise compliance with many of
the steps in the EEOC's conciliation process should deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Note, Jurisdictional Prerequisites to Private Actions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 Mo. L. REv.
215 (1976).
27 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968). The charge filed by the plaintiff in Choate was not "in writing under
oath" as was required under the original version of Title VII. The unamended language can be found in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). The Seventh Circuit held that the requirement of an oath was merely a prereq-
uisite to an EEOC investigation which the Commission had the power to waive. 402 F.2d at 360.
28 402 F.2d at 359.
29 Id.
30 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
31 Id. at 526.
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). See note 14 supra.
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to file a second charge with the EEOC after the state commission's action
would be to impose a technicality "particularly inappropriate in a statutory
scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.' 33
The Supreme Court's decision to construe Title VII liberally in Love pro-
vided the Fifth Circuit with a basis for finding the filing limitation to be subject
to equitable tolling in Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc. 34 Plaintiff Reeb
believed her employer's statement that her termination was due to a financial
cutback until she learned that she had been replaced several weeks later by an
allegedly less qualified male. The statutory filing limit had expired by the time
she made this discovery, so the district court dismissed her case for want of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed, and held that a court could toll the
filing period "until the facts that would support a charge of discrimination
under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a
reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff."3 5
Reeb has had little impact on the courts. The Fifth Circuit itself has never
applied the tolling principles in subsequent Title VII cases.3 6 This caused some
courts to announce that the Fifth Circuit had thus "joined the weight of
authority in ruling that the 180-day requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit" 37 by limiting the holding in Reeb to its facts. 38 Actually, the holding that
the filing limits are a jurisdictional prerequisite remains in dispute among the
circuits.3 9 Only the Seventh and Eighth circuits have consistently taken the
position that a timely filing is vital to a court's exercise of jurisdiction.40 The
only application of equitable tolling to the Title VII time limitations between
Reeb and Hart was in a decision by the District of Columbia Circuit involving a
charge filed within the proper time period, but with the wrong agency. 41
33 404 U.S. at 527.
34 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
35 Id. at 931.
36 See Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979); MacArthur v. Southern
Airways, 569 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1978); East v. Romine Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975). The principles of
equitable tolling were not even applied in the Reeb case on remand where the court found that a "reasonably
prudent person in Mrs. Reeb's situation should have become aware of the facts supporting this charge of
discrimination" before the date she alleged she had learned of her replacement. Reeb v. Economic Oppor-
tunity Atlanta, 15 FEP Cases 792 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Each of the opinions in these cases affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Reeb that the Title VII filing limitation can be tolled in equitable circumstances.
37 Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100, 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
38 Ashley v. Goshen Community Schools Corp., 461 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ind. 1978); Reeb v. Economic
Opportunity Atlanta, on remand, 15 FEP Cases 792 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409
F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
39 See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978); Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978) (in support ofequitable
tolling). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits had both concluded that equitable tolling was appropriate in collec-
tive bargaining cases, a position which has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Electrical Workers v. Rob-
bins &Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976). See Malone v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 457 F.2d 779 (9th Cir.
1972); Sanchez v. Trans World Airlines, 499 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1970).
40 See, e.g., Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co.,
511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975).
41 In Bethel v.Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the Civil Service Commission misinterpreted Ti-
tle VII provisions covering certain employees of governmental units in the District of Columbia. Although
Title VII granted the Civil Service Commission jurisdiction to investigate discrimination charges filed by
some District of Columbia employees, that commission mistakenly accepted charges filed by two officers of
the Metropolitan Police Department. The District of Columbia Circuit held that the failure of the officers to
file any charge with the EEOC should not bar them from instituting a private Title VII suit, because to bar
them would inflict a harsh penalty for an easily understandable mistake. It analogized the Title VII filing re-
quirements to a statute of limitations and tolled the requirements for filing until the date of its opinion.
618 [April 1980]
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C. Treatment by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's opinion in Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers,
Inc. 42 constitutes its only review of the possibility of equitable tolling of the fil-
ing limits. The Court has, however, ruled on whether other procedural steps
under Title VII are preconditions to federal subject matter jurisdiction.4 3 In
two of these cases, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green44 and Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 45 the Supreme Court referred to the timely filing of a charge with
the EEOC as a "jurisdictional prerequisite," although the nature of that pro-
cedural step was not at issue. Electrical Workers brought the question of the
possibility of equitably tolling the filing limits closer to resolution by forcing the
Court to decide whether the EEOC's filing limits could be tolled while the
charging party pursued her remedy through grievance proceedings provided
by a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist
writing for the five-man majority, disallowed the tolling. 46
The plaintiff in Electrical Workers argued that the Supreme Court had sanc-
tioned the use of tolling to avoid an inequitable result in an earlier case involv-
ing the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), Burnett v. New York Central R.
Co.47 The Supreme Court, however, distinguished the situation in Electrical
Workers from that in Burnett. In Burnett the plaintiff filed her FELA claim within
the time limit, but in the wrong court. The complainant in Electrical Workers, on
the other hand, freely elected to postpone filing a charge with the EEOC until
after her grievance had been reviewed by a board of union and management
representatives. The collective bargaining agreement did not prevent her from
pursuing her administrative remedy under Title VII. Thus, unlike the
employee in Burnett who merely chose the wrong forum, the plaintiff in Electrical
Workers had failed to assert her rights.
Another argument advanced by the plaintiff in Electrical Workers in favor of
equitable tolling was that the defendant would not be prejudiced by an exten-
sion of the filing limits. Since grievance proceedings were normally conducted
expeditiously, any delays occasioned by tolling during the proceedings would
be slight. Unpersuaded by the argument, the Court stated: "[i]n defining Title
VII's jurisdictional prerequisites 'with precision,' 48 ... Congress did not leave
to courts the decision as to which delays might or might not be 'slight.' ,,'9 It
then proceeded to mention that Congress had provided one exception to the
time limitation: the extension permitted when the complainant first files a
charge with a state or local agency. This strong language from the Supreme
Court indicates that the courts have very little discretion, or perhaps none at
42 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
43 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (filing limits not tolled during collective
bargaining grievance proceeding); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (EEOC find-
ing of reasonableness not a prerequisite); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972) (complainant could file
with EEOC first).
44 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
45 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
46 429 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). Four justices dissented on a related issue which made it unnecessary for
them to address the nature of the limitation.
47 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
48 415 U.S. at 47.
49 429 U.S. at 240.
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all, to toll the Title VII filing limitations. However, as the Third Circuit
analyzed Electrical Workers, the Supreme Court did not necessarily prohibit
equitable modification of those time limits in deserving cases.
IV. The Third Circuit's Analysis in Hart
The Third Circuit had previously ruled that the 180-day filing limit in the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)50 was not jurisdictional, but
rather had the nature of a statute of limitations.5 1 It had based this finding on a
liberal construction of the ADEA inspired by the Supreme Court's mandate in
Love v. Pullman Co.5 2 against the overly technical interpretation of statutory
schemes which rely on laymen to initiate the enforcement process. The distinc-
tions between the ADEA and Title VII were significant enough to prevent a
simple analogy from the ADEA's procedural requirements to the 180-day filing
limit under Title VII.5 3 The court relied instead on the substantive policy com-
mon to both acts-" the remedial and humanitarian goal of ending discrimina-
tion" 5 4 to hold that the filing requirements of Title VII should be interpreted in
the same "humane and commonsensical manner' " as those of the ADEA. In
this manner the court avoided rigid interpretations which could produce harsh
and inequitable results unless the language of Title VII or the Supreme Court's
opinion in Electrical Workers left it with no alternative but to interpret the filing
limitations as strictly jurisdictional.
The Third Circuit then pursued three lines of inquiry to ascertain whether
it was indeed free to adopt a more flexible approach to its construction of Title
VII. It examined the statute itself, studied the usage of the term "jurisdictional
prerequisite" by the Supreme Court, and analyzed the higher court's opinion
in Electrical Workers. The Third Circuit concluded that neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court had precluded the court's exercise of its equitable power to toll
the Title VII filing period.
The provision of Title VII which confers jurisdiction on the federal district
courts contains no qualifications. 56 It is situated in the same subsection as the
filing requirements. Nothing in this subsection, or in any other part of Title
50 29 U.S.C. §626(d) (1976), as amended by Act of April 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 5 4(b)(1), 92 Stat.
190, 191.
51 Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
52 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
53 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). Although Congress considered patterning the ADEA's en-
forcement procedures after those of Title VII, it ultimately combined features of Title VII, the National
Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Violations of the ADEA are generally to be treated
as violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
54 598 F.2d at 831 n.5.
55 Id. at 831.
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.
Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employ-
ment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment
records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in
which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment prac-
tice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought
within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. For purposes of sec-
tions 1404 and 1406 of title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office
shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought.
[April 1980)
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VII, withdraws the jurisdiction of the court over a claim which is not timely
filed. The Supreme Court had described the time limitations as
"jurisdictional" in McDonnell Douglas5 7 and Gardner-Denver8 without further
clarification. The Third Circuit did not consider itself obliged to accept that
description, since the statutory language was consonant with the view that the
filing limits were procedural requirements, or even conditions precedent.
These latter interpretations would allow for equitable tolling.
It next traced the usage of the term "jurisdictional prerequisite" by the
Supreme Court to its origin in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.59 This
reference, which the Third Circuit had previously characterized as dictum, 60
was used as support for the Supreme Court's later descriptions of the filing
limitations. 61 It maintained that these descriptions, offered "no real
guidance ' 62 to the Court of Appeals because the underlying logic of the term
"jurisdictional prerequisite" had never been analyzed. The Supreme Court
had never specified whether it intended to employ the term as a term of art.
Without such guidance, the Third Circuit believed itself to be at liberty to in-
terpret the timely filing requirement as something less than an absolute prereq-
uisite to subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, the Third Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's opinion in
Electrical Workers "as leaving open the possibility of tolling in certain limited cir-
cumstances." ' 63 It noted that the Supreme Court had distinguished Electrical
Workers from Burnett v. New York Central R. Co. 64 by contrasting the reasons the
plaintiffs in the cases had failed to file their complaints in a timely manner. The
employee in Electrical Workers chose not to file timely, while the employee in
Burnett made a serious attempt to file timely. The Third Circuit found that a
reasonable implication of this distinction is that the Title VII filing limitations
are tollable where a plaintiff is prevented from filing a charge within the
statutory time period. Noting that this distinction was consistent with the prin-
ciples of equitable tolling, it inferred the power to toll the Title VII filing period
from the Supreme Court itself.65
The Third Circuit declined to toll the filing limitations in Dr. Hart's case,
however. The district court had determined that Dr. Hart's suspicion of sexual
discrimination began on the day that she had been fired. Tolling the filing
period until a later date was unmerited. The court ruled that this finding of fact
from the lower court was not reversible error. 66 Its decision in Hart therefore,
while enriching Title VII jurisprudence, failed to provide it with an example of
a situation in which tolling would be appropriate.
57 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
58 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
59 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
60 Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
61 Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
62 598 F.2d at 832.
63 Id. at 833.
64 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
65 The Third Circuit noted that the Second Circuit had reached the same interpretation of Electrical
Workers, that it permitted equitable tolling in certain situations, in Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd.,
571 F.2d 102, 109 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978).
66 598 F.2d at 834.
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V. Critique
A. Title VII Interpretation
1. Arguments Supporting the Jurisdictional Prerequisite Theory
The Third Circuit correctly noted that the Supreme Court had never used
the adjective "jurisdictional" with reference to the Title VII timely filing re-
quirements with the precision and elaboration that would require one to
understand that the untimeliness itself of the EEOC charge deprived the
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, a reading of the statute
does not require such an interpretation. That is not the same, however, as say-
ing that Congress could not have intended the time period for initiating the ad-
ministrative process to be something more than an ordinary statute of limita-
tions. 67 If the Supreme Court understood the nature of the time limitation to be
"jurisdictional" in the fullest sense, it may have determined that no further
elaboration was necessary when it employed the phrase "jurisdictional prereq-
uisite," a "term of art with substantial legal significance." 68
One of the intentions of Congress in prescribing a definite time period for
filing a charge with the EEOC was to suppress stale claims. 69 A statute of
limitations would have been sufficient to accomplish this purpose, while allow-
ing for exceptions according to the common law principles of equitable tolling.
If Congress intended the statute to be strictly jurisdictional, and if it chose to
recognize any exceptions, these exceptions would have to be expressly stated in
Title VII. In Electrical Workers, the Supreme Court noted that Congress had
provided one exception for a complainant who initiates the administrative pro-
cess at the state or local level. 70 It refused to find another exception, "where
Congress has spoken," '7 t for a union member who initiated a contractual
grievance procedure before going to the EEOC. According to the "jurisdic-
tional prerequisite" theory, if Congress had intended to grant an extension of
the time period for victims of more subtle forms of discrimination who do not
discover a Title VII violation due to the employer's subterfuge, then it would
have had to include such a provision as an exception in the Act. This theory is
supported by indirect evidence in the statutory history of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) that Congress chose not to make such an ex-
ception.
Like Title VII, the ADEA contained a statutory 180-day limit for filing
notice of the alleged unlawful practice with the Secretary of Labor.72 Filing of
this notice is a precondition to commencement of a private civil action. 73
67 However, Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, who participated in the drafting of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, described the time period for filing a charge with the EEOC as a "statute of
limitations." 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964).
68 Brief for Appellee at 15.
69 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964), quoted in Kirk v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 578 F.2d 814, 819
(1978).
70 429 U.S. at 240.
71 Id.




Courts differed on whether this time limitation was subject to equitable
tolling. 74 While amending the Act in 1978, Congress considered eliminating
the 180-day-notice requirement altogether in the light of court dismissals of
complaints which were not timely filed. 75 The limitation was retained, but a
Senate report indicated support for the application of tolling principles. 76 One
of the reasons given was that age discrimination is often "more subtle and less
well understood than other forms of discrimination and therefore is often not
discovered by the victim until long after the alleged act has occurred." 77 The
"other forms of discrimination" referred to by the Senate report are those
covered by Title VII. The report suggests that subtle discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin does not merit the tolling of
the filing limitations, since Congress has not voiced its support for tolling under
Title VII despite the similar disagreement among the Circuits as to the nature
of those limitations.
2. Support for the Third Circuit's Viewpoint
That Title VII allows an interpretation of the filing limitations as jurisdic-
tional is nQt at issue. The question is whether such a construction would be
consistent with the admonition in Love v. Pullman Co. 78 that Title VII should not
be interpreted in a highly technical manner. There is nothing in the statutory
language which implies that Congress attached more importance to the
timeliness of the filing of a charge than to the issue of whether the charge was
filed "under oath." 79 Both requirements could be said to promote a valid Con-
gressional interest in protecting employers from certain unreasonable charges,
that is, stale complaints and frivolous allegations. But the courts have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to adopt the theory that Congress embellished Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with such procedural traps8 ° reminiscent of com-
mon law pleading when Congress placed such obvious reliance on the layman
to initiate the enforcement process. 81
The Supreme Court's opinion in Electrical Workers could be interpreted as
favoring the "jurisdictional prerequisite" theory. The Third Circuit's argu-
ment that the theory allows for equitable tolling depends upon-the Supreme
Court's treatment of Burnett v. New York R. Co.82 Of course, the Third Circuit
74 For a review of court treatment of this limitation see Note, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 457 (1977).
75 S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
515-16.
76 Id. The Senate Report noted that "[tjhe 180-day limit has been interpreted as jurisdictional by some
courts, and consequently complaints are dismissed.... In the committee's view, this provides a compelling
argument for removing the 180-day-notice requirement entirely."
77 Id. at 515.
78 404 U.S. 522 (1972). See text accompanying note 30 supra for the facts in this case.
79 Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968). See note 27 supra.
80 Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
81 See, e.g., Marhoom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1977); Egelston v. State Univ. College at
Geneseo, 535 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1976).
82 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
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could not deliver its blow to the "jurisdictional prerequisite" interpretation
without finding some support in Electrical Workers. In seizing upon the com-
parison to Burnett in Electrical Workers, however, the court acquired a weapon of
qualified trustworthiness. Burnett could potentially be distinguished from a case
in which an alert complainant failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC on
the basis that Burnett involved the filing limitation under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, which the Supreme Court had expressly held to be a
statute of limitations, subject to tolling under appropriate circumstances. 83
The most compelling reason for viewing the Title VII filing period as a
statute of limitations continues to be the admonition in Love v. Pullman Co.
against highly technical interpretations. As long as Electrical Workers remains
the Supreme Court's latest decision concerning the tolling controversy, the
Burnett distinction must be analyzed as the Third Circuit did in Hart in order to
recognize a court's equitable tolling power in a Title VII action. Love never-
theless will create the greatest obstacle to any future attempt by the Supreme
Court to mandate the "jurisdictional prerequisite" interpretation.
B. Appropriate Circumstances for Equitable Tolling
As previously noted, 84 even those courts which have held that the Title
VII filing requirements are subject to tolling have generally failed to toll the
time period for filing. An examination of the factual settings which have arisen
in Title VII cases and the circumstances under which the common law has
typically permitted the tolling of a statute of limitations suggests three situa-
tions in which tolling might be appropriate: (1) where the complainant has not
slept on his rights, but has filed a charge with the wrong agency; (2) where the
alleged violator actively prevented the filing of the charge; or (3) where the
alleged violator misled the complainant to prevent discovery of the discrimina-
tion.
If a complainant pursues an administrative remedy with the wrong agen-
cy, the period for filing a charge should be tolled until the complainant learns of
the mistake. 85 This situation would be the Title VII equivalent of Burnett. It
also should be a rare occurrence, since Title VII requires employers to post in-
formation notices explaining how to report an act of discrimination in employ-
ment.8 6 The employee is thus informed of the proper agency. 87 An employer
who failed to display the notice could be considered to be actively preventing
the filing of the charge. 88
83 Id. at 427.
84 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
85 Id.
86 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (1976).
87 In Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979), the plaintiff's reliance on a state
agency's promise to file a timely charge on her behalf with the EEOC was held to be insufficient justification
for tolling. Although she made repeated inquiries to the state agency and was misled to believe that the
charge had been filed, she could have easily ascertained the facts by telephoning the EEOC.
88 This allegation was made in Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1978). The
Court of Appeals held that tolling would he inappropriate since the plaintiff had promptly filed a charge with
the New York State Division of Human Rights and was represented by counsel at various times within the
300-day period permitted for EEOC filing.
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Another form of "active prevention" arose in a Sixth Circuit case, Leake v.
University of Cincinnati, 89 which was decided after Hart. During a period of
voluntary negotiation, the employer requested additional time to complete its
investigation, and agreed that, in return, it would not assert a time-bar claim
against the employee in a later suit. The Sixth Circuit held that the filing
limitation should be tolled for the employee who postponed filing her claim in
reliance on that agreement. 90 An employer could also prevent the filing of
claims by creating an atmosphere of intimidation so that forms of discrimina-
tion short of termination would go unreported by employees afraid of losing
their jobs. Most of those cases, however, would be likely to also entail some
type of "continuing discrimination" 91 which would be actionable even without
equitable tolling.
The possibility of equitable tolling holds promise for the misled employee
who discovers the discrimination after the filing period has expired. The opin-
ion in Hart, however, would toll the period only until the employee first
suspects discrimination. The level of suspicion which would trigger the time
limitations need not amount to the discovery of some real evidence. The Fifth
Circuit in Reeb has suggested that the tolling continue until the facts which
would support a Title VII charge are apparent or should be apparent to an
employee in the plaintiff's position with a "reasonably prudent regard for his
rights.' '92 In its application, however, such a low threshold of suspicion has
been required that not even Mrs. Reeb was able to benefit from the court's toll-
ing power. 93 The Reeb standard seems appropriate, but it should not be applied
so as to require the employee to be overly suspicious of his or her employer's
motivations. Unless Hart assists the employee who mistakenly trusts an
employer, it is unlikely to add much strength to the enforcement of Title VII.
VI. Conclusion
The fact that the Third Circuit declined to toll the time limitations in Dr.
Hart's circumstances does not diminish the value of its holding in Hart that the
Title VII time period for filing a charge with the EEOC is subject to equitable
tolling. Its analysis of the nature of that limitation through a liberal reading of
Title VII will be difficult to discredit without finding that Congress built a type
of common law pleading into an enforcement provision designed to be used by
complainants without the assistance of a lawyer. It remains for the courts in
future cases to weigh the equities of granting relief to the particular plaintiff in
question. Although Dr. Hart may have slept on her rights, the holding in her
case declares that proper occasions for the tolling of the time limits do exist.
89 605 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1979).
90 Id. at 259.
91 See note 11 supra.
92 516 F.2d at 931.
93 Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, on remand, 15 FEP Cases 792 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Some
evidence existed that she maintained sufficient contact with her former employer to have discovered at an
earlier date that she had been replaced. However, the court also suggests that she should have become
suspicious when told that she was being terminated because of the unavailability of funds, since the entire
program was not being terminated. The court concluded that with her experience in government programs,
she should have known that the one she headed would need someone else to run it.
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The Third Circuit's decision in Hart will not affect the majority of victims
of invidious discrimination who quickly suspect that some practice or act of
their employer is illegal under Title VII. But for those employees who have
been deceived as to the reasons for a discriminatory employment practice, Hart
provides access to the federal courts upon the failure of the EEOC to achieve a
satisfactory conciliation with the employer.
Steven M. Zarowny
